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• ALTRIA v. GOOD - BRIEF OF 48 STATES (PDF) 

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act expressly preempts state-law claims that a cigarette company violated the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act by falsely representing its “light” cigarettes to the public when the predicate state-law duty of such claims is the duty not to deceive.

2. Whether such claims are impliedly preempted where the FTC has never exercised its rulemaking power to address the conduct at issue nor defined the terms at issue in this dispute. . . .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case presents the questions whether the FCLAA or the actions of the FTC preempt state-law deception claims arising out of Petitioners’ practices with respect to “low tar and nicotine” and “light” cigarettes. Neither the FCLAA nor the actions of the FTC license Petitioners to deceive consumers in violation of state law. Immunizing Petitioners from the consequences of the alleged wrongful conduct is not a result that should be presumed without clear language and intent, neither of which is present here.

1. In Cipollone v. Liggett, 505 U.S. 504 (1992), the Court held that the FCLAA does not preempt claims resting upon false representation of a material fact or concealment of a material fact by tobacco companies where such claims are founded upon a general duty under state law not to deceive. The suit at issue here brings precisely such claims. It seeks economic, not personal injury, damages, under Maine’s general prohibition against any “material representation, omission, act or practice that is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.” Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 207 (Supp. 2007). Because the lawsuit before the Court is predicated upon a general statutory prohibition against deception (that the manufacturers made false statements and concealed information regarding “light” cigarettes), under Cipollone it is not preempted. To find otherwise would disrupt and do serious harm to the sovereigns’ complementary efforts to protect consumers, which would have adverse implications beyond the “light” cigarettes dispute before the Court here. State law suits pursuant to state unfair practices and consumer protection statutes combating deceptive practices are a critical complement to the administrative and prosecutorial efforts of the FTC. In fact, recognizing that it cannot combat consumer fraud on its own, FTC regulations direct the agency “to assist and cooperate” with state consumer protection efforts. One common outgrowth of that cooperation is that the FTC and the States often target the same wrongdoers, which sometimes results in separate settlements that provide different forms of relief. There is no exception in this complementary regulatory scheme for fraud or deception by cigarette manufacturers. Indeed, the FTC acknowledges the States’ vital part in prohibiting deception by tobacco companies.

2. Petitioners’ arguments that the FTC has somehow impliedly preempted the state-law claims are patently incorrect. Nothing in the text, structure, or regulatory history of the FTC Act or in the actions of the FTC relating to “light” cigarettes supports implied preemption. Petitioners are not claiming that the FTC Act itself imposes requirements on tobacco companies that conflict with state law. Nor could they, given that the FTC Act lacks an express preemption provision and instead contains a broad saving clause protecting state remedies and causes of action. In addition, Congress imposed heightened requirements for FTC rulemaking, and the FTC’s procedural rules require that it explain the impact of any of its rules on state law. And petitioners do not assert that the FTC has promulgated specific rules that preempt state-law actions with respect to “low tar” and “light” cigarettes. Rather, Petitioners’ implied preemption claim is based on their assertion that the FTC has blessed tobacco companies’ “light” cigarette advertisements through a history of less formal actions, such as consent decrees reached with individual companies. But neither the consent decrees nor the other actions relied upon by Petitioners mandated or approved Petitioners’ “light” and “low tar” advertisements. Moreover, in none of those actions did the FTC ever suggest that State consumer protection laws present an obstacle to, or are preempted by, some sort of FTC policy. Indeed, the FTC has eschewed any suggestion that its actions have resolved the issue of tobacco companies’ deceptive practices regarding “low tar” cigarettes. . . .

* * * The common purpose of the FTC Act and State unfair trade practices and consumer protection acts, such as Maine’s, is to protect consumers from deceptive practices. The FTC has been most sensitive to this relationship, as have the courts. Finding preemption here would run counter to how the FTC and the States have worked cooperatively together, and would do serious harm to that relationship and to the protections afforded consumers through their efforts. The particular claims of deception here fall squarely within those permitted under Cipollone, and the FTC has not established a cohesive policy impliedly preempting the States with respect to deceitful conduct by tobacco companies regarding “low tar” and “light” cigarettes. For these reasons, the Court should find that the state-law claims before it are not preempted.

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