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The Survey as PR

"Business at New York bars and restaurants has plummeted by as much as 50 percent in the wake of the smoking ban - and the drop has already sparked layoffs and left some establishments on the brink of shutting their doors, a Post survey has found."

--Cig Ban Leaves Lot Of 'Empties', New York Post, May 12, 2003

On May 12, 2003, the New York Post ran two stories on its survey of 50 "randomly selected" New York City bars and restaurants. 1,2. The survey found that,

"34 of the 50 businesses queried have shown a decline in business since April. . . The median of those reporting declines was a 30 percent cut in business."

The news media universally accepted the Post survey at face value and repeated its findings without qualification, giving readers the impression that restaurant business really had fallen off by as much as 50 percent.

The AP distributed the story around the world as straight news. 3. The Washington Post's "Media Critic" quoted the NY Post sans criticism. 4 A Connecticut newspaper used the report to rail against an incipient state-wide smoking ban. 5 New Zealand's Hospitality Association--erroneously attributing the survey to the New York Times--used it to argue against smokefree legislation. 6 And to right wing talk show host Rush Limbaugh, the survey was the very pinnacle of scientific endeavor. 7 Within a month, the findings had entered a never-never-land of received knowledge, disembodied from any source at all, and often deployed as established or likely fact in efforts to defeat smokefree air legislation in other localities. (See examples below.*)

Why the media should take this survey so literally is a mystery, as it was uncredited, unverifiable, and had glaring faults.

1. The survey was clearly not done by a professional research company; it was solely referenced as a "Post survey." The survey was actually conducted by the reporter herself. Her data is not available.

2. It seems unlikely that this was a "random" survey. The random claim, repeated by the Post as late as May 24, 2003 8 seems on its face, misleading--at least 4 of the restaurateurs cited were on record as opposing smoking bans. The law of averages argues against these four opponents randomly turning up in a survey of 50 out of the 20,000-plus drinking and eating establishments in New York City. 9, 10 Even considering the author's sources--two Zagat's Guides--that still entails 2,100 establishments. Since the data is unavailable, it's impossible to tell if the other businesses reporting losses were similar known opponents.

3. The survey design mimics a notorious tobacco industry PR tactic, the "30% Myth." 11

To elaborate:

1. Jeane MacIntosh, the author of the articles, said in a phone interview on June 12, 2003 that she had conducted the survey herself by phoning owners or managers from an economic cross section of 50 bars and restaurants chosen out of the Zagat's NYC Restaurants Guide and Zagat's NYC Nightlife Guide.

2. At least three smoking ban opponents from the 1994-95 battle were featured in the NY Post's random survey: Joan Borkowski 12, Buzzy O'Keefe. 13 and John McFadden. 14 A fourth restaurateur, Langan's proprietor Desi O'Brien, had voiced his opposition to the 2003 ban in at least two newspaper articles 15,16 --one of which was in the NY Post itself. In 1994, Langan's was a signator to a full page ad in the New York Post--opposing the proposed legislation "because it will hurt our business." The ad was paid for by the signators and "The United Restaurant, Hotel Tavern Association of New York State, Inc., Lorillard Tobacco Company and Philip Morris U.S.A." 16.5

No restaurateur's previous opposition was mentioned. In addition, one bar surveyed was named "Smoke."

That 4 noted smoking ban opponents should represent a random survey strains credulity, but one of the cited opponents was something more than that. Joan Borkowski, owner of Billy's Tavern, was afforded an entire companion article, "1870 Bar May Get $nuffed Out."

But the Post neglected to inform its readers that in 1995, Borkowski was the leader of a vaporous Philip Morris-funded group, the Manhattan Tavern and Restaurant Owners Association**, which fought to repeal the city's new smoking ban.

On May 9, 1995, Borkowski held a meeting to release 2 opinion surveys. One survey was commissioned by the Philip Morris-funded National Smokers Alliance (NSA); the other was sponsored by the Philip Morris-funded United Restaurant, Hotel, Tavern Association of New York State (AKA New York Tavern & Restaurant Association ***). At the Hotel Roosevelt meeting --which was facilitated by a NSA-financed 10,000-restaurant mailing on "Billy's Tavern" letterhead--Borkowski released the surveys in association with the NSA. 12 The New York Post reported:

"[S]urveys by the National Smokers Alliance and the New York Tavern and Restaurant Association found that 51 percent of the restaurants suffered a drop in sales since the ban became law 30 days ago."17

Author Jeane MacIntosh said she was not in town during the 1994-95 smoking ban wars, and thus did not necessarily know that three of her referenced proprietors had publicly fought the ban. She said her survey also included interviews with smoking ban advocates-- Michael O'Neal, for example, and "the proprietor of Joe Allen's." Neither was cited in the article, although one sentence did read, "Eleven bars or restaurants noted little to no change, and three of them in Manhattan - Daniel, Bemelman's Bar and Automatic Slims - said business has been up since the ban." Other than this sentence, the article emphasized the negative responses, and even featured an accompanying picture of an empty bar with the caption,

"BORED SHOTLESS: The staff at the Playwright Grill on Eighth Avenue in the Theatre District has lots of time to kill, now that smokers are staying away from the bar."

3. It's odd to consider that newspapers with reputations to protect, such as the Washington Post and the Times of London, would accept the New York Post as an unqualifiedly reliable source of information. But in fact none of the media repeating these findings questioned the survey.

Not one news organization even noted the 2 stories' website header:

"Has your bar or restaurant been fined or warned for having patrons smoke? Give The Post a call at 212 930-8500 and tell us your story."

This plea ran on many online Post stories throughout May, 2003, and for months after existed as a prominent footer at the Post's News Index page at http://www.nypost.com/news/news.htm. It was last seen here on August 12, 2003

Further, not one news organization noted the Post's history of strong editorial antagonism not only to previous smokefree policies 18, but to this ban in particular. 19 Not one noted the Post's casual attitude to separating news from editorial. Not one noted the Post's striking lack of coverage of the health hazards of smoking throughout the '90s--despite its weekly "Health" page. And not one noted that during this period -- from 1989 to 2001--the New York Post's owner, Rupert Murdoch, sat on the Board of Directors of Philip Morris. 20

Implications:

The Post survey follows the pattern set by a tobacco industry tactic that has been used since 1987. The survey-as-PR tactic was exposed by Consumer Reports in 1994 and dubbed "The 30% Myth." (See excerpt below.****)

The weakness of such surveys is that they are based solely on opinions, which can not only be wrong, they can often be manipulated. These surveys are usually deployed 1) during legislative battles or 2) shortly after a smoking ban has gone into effect. Scientifically verifiable studies based on tax and employment data have consistently proven these surveys to be not only grossly exaggerated, but plainly wrong. 21

A prime example of this weakness may be found in New York City itself, when it passed a restaurant smoking ban in 1995. Immediately after it went into effect, the Tobacco Institute hired Price Waterhouse to perform monthly opinion surveys. These polls all concluded the ban was hurting the restaurant business. But in fact, restaurant and hotel sales tax receipts actually increased in the city after the ban--while decreasing in the rest of the state. 21b

It should be noted that these surveys can be greatly influenced by previous PR efforts. Long before the survey, a tobacco company, PR firm or front group can prepare the ground by unleashing an ad campaign projecting business losses. After this, it can then directly contact restaurateurs--through mailings, phone calls, and personal visits--and present a few harrowing stories and prognostications. A few months later, when confronted by surveyors, a restaurateur may well repeat such assertions.

For maximum PR effect, the sin of commission may be accompanied by sins of omission. Most of the outlets and authors cited below failed to note a major June, 2003 study from Cornell University. 22 This study of taxable sales and employment levels in 5 New York localities (4 counties plus New York City and its boroughs) which had passed smoking bans since 1995, found that as of December, 2002,

"Statistically significant increases in eating and drinking and hotel taxable sales were associated with the presence of the smoke-free regulations." [emphasis added]

The PR power of a survey like the Post's is greatly magnified when restaurateurs in other localities read unquestioning news coverage of it. In the absence of solid sales-tax data, such a survey can represent the only information available. A rumored decline in business due to a smoking ban can, with repitition and aggressive promotion by vested interests, become received knowledge, often disembodied from its source and continuously refreshed and rehashed by tobacco companies and even by the ostensibly disinterested media.

In summary: one unscientific survey can be accepted by the media at face value, and can function as powerful PR, spreading fear and misinformation worldwide with astonishing speed.

* A Sampling of media coverage of the economic results of New York City's smoking ban:

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